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RECENT DECISIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES-FEDERAL
TAX ON STATE FUNCTION-In 19II the State of New York began to acquire
title to all of the lands in the Saratoga Springs area with a view to halting excessive pumping of th,e mineral waters for which the springs are famous. As a
result of state ownership the area became a state reservation which, in 1930, was
placed under control of, the Saratoga Springs Commission. A hotel-sanitarium,
recreational facilities, bath houses, drink halls, a research laboratory as well as
state operation of the springs were part of a state program under legislative
authority. During the period from 1932 to 1934, sales of the mineral waters
were promoted by advertising and customarily yielded a profit used by the commission to defray other expenses in the operation of the reservation. Section 615
(a) (5) of the 1932 Revenue Act imposed an excise on mineral waters sold by
the producer or bottler. 1 The United States brought suit in the federal District
Court for the Northern District of New York to recover taxes assessed for the
period from June, 1932 to May, 1934, and received a judgment in its favor.
The district court rested its decision on the ground that the bottling and sale of
the waters was a business enterprise conducted for profit rather than a governmental function immune from federal taxation. 2 The circuit court of appeals
affirmed. It took the position that the state was engaged in a business for profit
in competition with others and was not immune from federal taxation on ~he
theory th,at the state was performing a non-taxable governmental function, even
though the program might be of great public value; also that the fundamental
consideration in determining whether a state activity is immune from taxation
must be that immunity arises from the necessity of preserving the continued
existence of the state.8 On certiorari, held, affirmed. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion in which Justice
Rutledge concurred. Chief Justice Stone delivered a concurring opinion in which
Justices Reed, Murphy, and Burton joined. Justices Douglas and Black concurred in a dissenting opinion. New York v. United States, (U.S. 1946)
66 S. Ct. 310.
.
It is clear that the decision could have been rested on precedent alone without attempts to redefine intergovernmental immunities. 4 Just~ce Frankfurter's
1
Revenue Act of 1932, § 615 (a) (5), 47 Stat. L. 169 at 264 (1932); this section was repealed by the 1934 Act, effective after May 10, 1934.
2
United States v. State of New York, (D.C.N.Y. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 15.
8 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 608.
.
Note the statement by Chase, J., at 610: "We think the fundamental consideration
must be that exemption from federal taxation in a particular case flows from the necessity to protect the continued existence of a state."
4
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110 (1905) (State
engaged in sale of intoxicating liquor held subject to federal excise taxation); State
of Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 725 (1934) (State-operated liquor
stores held subject to federal excise taxation); Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439, 58 S.
Ct. 980 ( 1938) (Football tickets sold by state educational institution held subject to
the federal admissions tax on the ground that immunity does not extend to business
enterprises conducted for gain); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 55 S. Ct. 171
(1934) (Salaries of officers of state-operated municipal railway subject to federal income taxation on the ground that state business enterprises are not immune from general
taxation by the federal government).
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opinion recognizes the difficulties inherent in a judicial determination of the
question whether a state's activity is governmental or proprietary. It also notes
the recent trends pointing to limitations on tax immunity. Justice Frankfurter
would prefer to recognize a power in Congress to tap sources of revenue by
whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned by a state instead
of attempting to determine, by terms defying definition, how far the immunity of the states should be limited or extended. 5 In the concurring opinion the
Chief Justice apparently restricts immunity to cases where a tax unduly interferes with the performance of the state's functions of government. 6 Emphasis in
his opinion is placed on South Carolina v. United States 1 and State of Ohio v.
Helvering. 8 However, curtailment of federal taxing power by extension of state
functions is advanced as an important consideration in determining the area of
immunity. 9 In his dissent Justice Douglas rejects the test of South Carolina v. United States and other decisions of similar nature and states that the
necessary result of these cases, in making the states pay the federal government
for the privilege of exercising powers of sovereignty guaranteed by the Constitution, is to place the states in the same position as private citizens. Justice
Douglas avers that a state project is no less governmental ?Ctivity whether it is
traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit. 10 State ownership and operation of public utilities, disposition of natural resources, and activities in the exercise of the police power should not be subject to federal taxation
for the reason that the result is necessarily either an increased cost of state and
local government or curtailment of state function. Tax immunity based on the
state's sovereignty appears to be the objective or·test recommended by the dissenting justices.11 With reference to the dissent's position it may be noted that
5
Principal case at 314: "But so long as Congress generally taps a source of revenue
by whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State, the
Constitution of the United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls
also on a State."
6 Principal case at 3 I 7: "The tax reaches the State because of the Congressional
purpose to lay the tax on the subject matter chosen, regardless of who pays it. To
say that the tax fails because the State happens to be the taxpayer is only to say that
the State, to some extent undefined, is constitutionally immune from federal taxation.
Only when and because the subject of taxation is State property or a State activity must
we consider whether such a non-discriminatory tax unduly interferes with the performance of the State's functions of government."
7
199 U.S. 437, z6 S. Ct. 110 (1905), see footnote 5, supra.
8
z9z U.S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 7z5 (1934), see footnote 5, supra.
9 Principal case at 317: "The national taxing power would be unduly curtailed
if the State, by extending its activities, could withdraw from it subjects of taxation
traditionally within it."
10 Dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, principal case at 3 18: "I do not
believe State of South Carqlina v. United States states the correct rule. A State's project
is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is traditional, or akin to private
enterprise, or conducted for profit."
11 Justice Douglas cites the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819), as adequate to sustain the case for the
reciprocal immunity of the state and federal government. For Chief Justice Marshall's
statement of immunity in terms of the extent of sovereignty, see 4 Wheat (17 U.S.)
316 at 429, 430.
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some distinction is recognized generally between those functions characterized
variously as governmental, traditional, or unique and those labeled as proprietary,
for profit, in the nature of private business, or non-governmental.1 2 A trend in
the limitation of intergovernmental immunities is clearly evident; and the decision in the principal case is consistent with this trend. No particular test or
measure for general application in the field can be said to result from the decision
here; nor is light shed on the oft-discussed problem of taxation of the income
from state bonds. 18 At most, one may conjecture, that, in the future, immunity
will continue to be found in those cases where the tax unduly interferes with the
performance of the state's functions of government, as indicated in the concuring opinion written by the Chief Justice and commanding the support of three
other members of the Court. In any event, the extreme view taken by Justice
Frankfurter can hardly be said to represent the Court's position at this time.

Joseph N. Morency, Jr.

12 The distinction is well recognized in cases dealing with liability of municipal
corporations for the tortious acts of municipal officers and employees. See Borchard,
"Government Liability in Tort," 34 YALE L. J. 229 (1925); McQu1LLAN ON MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS 2d ed., § 2850 (1921).
For a leading case see, Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387_, II4 N.E.
722 (1917).
18 See Powell, "The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities," 58 HARV.
L. REv. 757 (1945); Gray, "Derivative Tax Immunity and the Income from State
Bonds," 41 CoL. L. REv. 1357 (1941).
See also, Commissioner v. Estate of Shamberg, (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 144 F. (2d)
998, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792, 65 S. Ct. 433 (1945), holding that interest on bonds
issued by the New York Port Authority was non-taxable in view of the exemption
expressly granted by Congress in section 22 (b) (4) of the Code of Internal Revenue
with respect to interest upon the obligations of a state or any political subdivision
thereof. In reaching the result that the authority was a "political subdivision" of the
state, the court expressed the view that the construction, maintenance, and operation
of roads and bridges is a customary governmental activity.

